Nafta’s Promise, Unfulfilled

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By ELISABETH MALKIN

Published: March 23, 2009

MEXICO CITY — Mexico’s former president, Carlos Salinas, used to promise that free trade and foreign investment would jump-start this country’s development, empowering a richer and more prosperous Mexico “to export goods, not people.”

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Henry Romero/Reuters

A General Motors assembly line in Silao, Mexico. Mexico’s exports have quintupled under Nafta, to $292 billion last year.

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Times Topics: North American Free Trade Agreement

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Henry Romero/Reuters

Nafta, signed by President Carlos Salinas of Mexico, left, and President Bill Clinton, has been in effect for 15 years.

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Alejandro Bringas/Reuters

Workers at a factory in Ciudad Juárez. Economic growth in Mexico under Nafta has not been sufficient to create enough jobs for the million young people who enter the work force each year.

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Fifteen years after the North American Free Trade Agreement took effect, only the first part of that promise has been realized.

Mexico’s exports have exploded underNafta, quintupling to $292 billion last year, but Mexico is still exporting people too, almost half a million each year, seeking opportunities in the United States that they do not have at home.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton will arrive in Mexico on Wednesday and President Obama will visit next month. Both are expected to emphasize the successes of American-Mexican economic cooperation, but it will be hard to ignore how much in Mexico has not changed under Nafta.

Economists here say much of the blame lies with Mexican leaders, unable or unwilling to take on oligarchs and unions controlling key sectors of the economy like energy and telecommunications. But they say some blame goes to the unintended consequences of Nafta.

In some cases, Nafta produced results that were exactly the opposite of what was promised.

For instance, domestic industries were dismantled as multinationals imported parts from their own suppliers.

Local farmers were priced out of the market by food imported tariff-free. Many Mexican farmers simply abandoned their land and headed north.

Although one-quarter of Mexicans live in the countryside, they account for 44 percent of the migrants to the United States. The contradictions of Nafta are apparent in Guadalajara and the rich farmland around it.

On the road from the airport to the city, Mexico’s second-largest, a well-worn sign welcomes visitors to Mexico’s Silicon Valley. After Nafta went into effect, the comparison seemed ambitious but not out of reach.

Global giants spent billions of dollars turning Guadalajara into a manufacturing hub for the information technology industry. The industry boomed, spurred by cheap labor and the sense that Nafta guaranteed investor-friendly policies. Today the city is ringed with low-slung factories that churn out everything from BlackBerrys to digital tape storage libraries for Sun Microsystems.

But investors came because the city was already a center of technology. I.B.M, Hewlett-Packard and others had come in the 1960s and 1970s when Mexico’s market was closed.

After Nafta, the new factories imported parts from their global suppliers, wiping out local companies that had sold printed circuit boards or assembled computers under tariff protection, said Kevin P. Gallagher, a Boston University professor who has written about the Guadalajara information technology industry.

Things grew worse when the tech bubble burst, the American economy cooled and the companies moved to China, where they could pay even lower wages. Once China entered the World Trade Organization, Mexico lost much of the edge in exporting to the United States that Nafta had given it. Employment in Guadalajara’s I.T. factories dropped 37 percent in 2001 and continued to slide for two years.

“The agreement could have brought investment with more value here,” including research, testing and design, said Jesús Palomino, the general manager at Intel’s design center in Guadalajara. “But we did not know how to define or negotiate or take advantage of it.”

Mr. Palomino argues that attracting multinational manufacturers was too limited a focus. He oversees about 300 young engineers who test future Intel products and carry out research and development. The sophisticated Intel design center is an exception to the city’s assembly plants. Those factories mostly hire low-wage labor.

“A new phenomenon has grown up under Nafta — high-productivity poverty,” said Harley Shaiken, chairman of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.

Low wages means low purchasing power. “It is not a successful strategy for globalization,” Mr. Shaiken said.

Even Nafta’s greatest success — exports — has become a liability, as Mexico feels the full brunt of declining consumption in the United States. The auto industry, for example, which has flourished under Nafta, has ground to a virtual standstill. Over all, Mexican auto exports fell more than 50 percent in the first two months of this year compared with 2008, and production dropped almost 45 percent.

The central bank forecasts that as many as 340,000 people could lose their jobs this year, and some investment banks predict the economy could contract as much as 5 percent.

That weakness has driven down the peso, which has lost about a quarter of its value in the last six months. Foreign direct investment fell last year to $18.6 billion from $27.2 billion in 2007.

Still, economists here say much of the responsibility for the lack of development in the last decade and a half lies largely with Mexican leaders and their unwillingness or inability to enact real reforms. “We have an economy that has atrophied because of the lack of reform,” said Gerardo Esquivel, an economist at the Colegio de México.

Other developing countries benefited from globalization, particularly in Asia. But in Mexico, economic growth has averaged about 3 percent a year since Nafta took effect, far below what is needed to create jobs for the million young people who enter the work force each year and the millions more who barely scrape by.

As presidential candidates, both President Obama and Mrs. Clinton promised to renegotiate Nafta. But when Mr. Obama arrives next month, he will find Mexico’s leaders reluctant to revisit the agreement. He will also find them seething over his signing of a spending bill that scrapped a pilot program allowing Mexican long-haul trucks to transport cargo throughout the United States. In retaliation, Mexico has imposed punitive tariffs on $2.4 billion worth of American goods.

Nafta guaranteed Mexico, Canada and the United States access to one another’s highways for cargo transport by 2000.

Perhaps the Mexicans least prepared for globalization were Mexico’s small farmers.

“It isn’t possible for a peasant to make a living from the countryside,” said Francisco Vargas, president of an association that groups together 2,500 farmers from Etzatlán, about 90 minutes west of Guadalajara.

The farmers hold other jobs to subsidize their farming. Mr. Vargas is a teacher. Another of the group’s leaders is a retired accountant; a third has a sideline renting out construction equipment. Some farmers continue thanks to money sent by relatives working in the United States.

Farmers in the region have survived Nafta by raising corn yields through converting to modern farming techniques. They also lobby for government aid and band together to fight private oligopolies that sell seed and buy corn.

But their landholdings remain small, sometimes not more than about 10 acres, and they are at the mercy of rising costs and fluctuating prices. Seed is up about 20 percent because of the peso’s devaluation, while corn is off the high of last year as global demand drops.

The farmers say that they have raised their yields to double Mexico’s average of three metric tons per hectare, or more. (The average for the United States is more than nine tons per hectare.) Late last year, their high yields caught the attention of the federal government in Mexico City, which has promised new financing for the Etzatlán farmers and other commercial corn farmers.

“It’s a race against time,” said Antonio Hernández, an agronomist who advises the farmers for a coalition of farming associations in Jalisco state. “We have to demonstrate this before people abandon the land.”

I.T. industry leaders and the local government in Guadalajara are trying to do the same thing: convince Mexicans that there is opportunity at home.

The group representing the industry in Mexico, known by its Spanish initials as Canieti, now promotes Guadalajara’s ability to produce customized products for customers in the United States, specialized corporate software and portions of software for operating systems. Canieti officials also promote the advantage for “pizza products,” like new cellphones that must be delivered on time.

The government and Canieti have put up $4 million to buy equipment and train 150 young people in computer animation, in a bid to attract joint ventures for co-productions and video games.

But Mr. Palomino, the general manager at the Intel design center, argues that the industry should also promote small local companies and encourage them to establish joint ventures in the United States. Those changes would nourish a culture of entrepreneurship that he believes has yet to emerge.

Professor Gallagher at Boston University argues that free trade on its own does not bring development. “Nafta was a great opportunity, but you had to build on it,” he said.

La táctica y estrategia

Paul Krugman reprueba el paquete para limpiar de activos tóxicos las hojas de balance de los bancos estadounidenses. No obstante, la medida ha causado una buena impresión en los mercados de capital lo que implica confianza que es el activo más importante en una crisis como lo explica este excelente artículo. 

When the economy really did fall of a cliff. 

March 23, 2009

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

When the Economy Really Did ‘Fall Off a Cliff’

By JEAN STROUSE

IN what may come to be the definitive line about our current economic crisis, Warren Buffett said on the CNBC program “Squawk Box” this month that the United States economy has “fallen off a cliff.”

The most trusted investor in history went on the air to talk, with characteristic candor and humor, about the horrendous truth we pretty much know, possibly in an effort to calm things down and point toward some answers we don’t yet know. He proceeded to give his views on what went wrong (“everybody thought house prices could go nothing but up ... so you had $11 trillion of residential mortgage debt built on this theory ”), on people’s paralyzing fear and confusion (“We are in a very, very vicious negative feedback cycle .... I don’t want this to be the last line of the movie”), and on the absolute necessity of fixing the banks and taking clear, decisive action.

A look back at the handling of another financial crisis a full century ago underlines the point about decisive action. You just don’t want to take the wrong decisive action. Markets today are immeasurably more complex, global, fast-moving and regulated (a lot of good that did) than they were a hundred years ago, but the need for strong leadership has not changed.

In early 1906, the banker Jacob Schiff told a group of colleagues that if the United States did not modernize its banking and currency systems, its economy would, in effect, fall off a cliff — that the country would “have such a panic ... as will make all previous panics look like child’s play.”

Yet the country failed to reform its financial institutions, and conditions deteriorated steadily over the next 20 months. There was a worldwide credit shortage. The American stock market crashed twice. The young Dow Jones industrial average lost half of its value.

In October 1907, when a panic started among trust companies in New York and terrified depositors lined up to get their money out, Schiff’s dire prediction seemed about to come true. The United States had no Federal Reserve, the Treasury secretary did not have much political authority, and the president, Theodore Roosevelt, was off shooting game in Louisiana.

J. Pierpont Morgan, a 70-year-old private banker, quietly took charge of the situation.

In the absence of a central bank, Morgan had for decades been acting as the country’s unofficial lender of last resort, gathering reserves and supplying capital to the markets in periods of crisis. For two harrowing weeks in 1907, with the whole world watching, he operated like a general, deploying three young lieutenants to do leg work and supply him with information, and bringing two other leading bankers, James Stillman of National City Bank and George Baker of the First National Bank, into a senior “trio” to make executive decisions. (First National and National City eventually combined to form what is now Citigroup — are the shades of Baker and Stillman writhing over what has become of their descendant institution?)

The Morgan teams ran “stress tests” on the unregulated trust companies, figuring out which were impossibly overleveraged and should be allowed to fail, and which were basically sound but crippled by the panic. Once they had determined that a trust was essentially healthy, the bankers supplied it with cash, matching their loans dollar-for-dollar with the trust’s collateral assets.

When the New York Stock Exchange nearly closed early one day in October 1907 because financial institutions calling in loans were choking off the market’s money supply, Morgan summoned the presidents of New York’s major commercial banks to his office and came up with $24 million to lend to the exchange. Next, New York City ran out of cash to meet its payroll and interest obligations; Morgan and company conjured up a $30 million loan and prevented default.

At the end of Week 1, President Roosevelt sent a letter to the press congratulating the “substantial businessmen who in this crisis have acted with such wisdom and public spirit.” Shipments of gold were on the way from London to New York, and confidence had returned to the French Bourse, “owing,” reported one paper, “to the belief that the strong men in American finance would succeed in their efforts to check the spirit of the panic.” During a panic, confidence is almost as good as gold.

At the end of Week 2, Morgan called 50 presidents of trust companies to his private library on East 36th Street, locked the doors, and did not let them out until they had signed on to a final $25 million loan. The scholar of Renaissance art Bernard Berenson told his patron Isabella Stewart Gardner that “Morgan should be represented as buttressing up the tottering fabric of finance the way Giotto painted St. Francis holding up the falling church with his shoulder.”

Though Morgan had a large sense of public duty, he had not shouldered the falling church out of pure altruism. His self-interest operated on a national scale. His clients — many of them Europeans who had invested for decades in the emerging American economy through the House of Morgan — had billions of dollars committed in the United States. In watching over their long-term interests, trying to control the excesses of the business cycle and maintain the value of the dollar, Morgan had come to serve as guardian of American credit in international markets.

His power in 1907 derived not from the size of his own fortune but from the trust placed in him by investors, other bankers and international statesman. After Morgan died in 1913, the newspapers reported his net worth as about $80 million — roughly $1.7 billion in today’s dollars. John D. Rockefeller, already worth a billion in 1913 dollars, is said to have read the figure, shaken his head, and remarked, “And to think he wasn’t even a rich man.”

Trust in Morgan was by no means universal. In 1907, some of his critics charged that he had started the panic in order to scoop up assets at fire-sale prices and line his own pockets. In fact, the Morgan banks lost $21 million that year.

The difficulty today of assigning dollar values to “toxic” assets makes Morgan’s job look easy. Yet though the amount of money required for the 1907 bailouts is pocket change compared to the current trillions, at the time, the troubles and the numbers seemed enormous.

No single figure, much less a private banker, could wield the kind of power in today’s gargantuan collapsing markets that Morgan had a hundred years ago. And so far, not even the combined official powers of the Fed and Treasury have been able to stop the cascading disasters. Paul Volcker, the former Federal Reserve chairman, said recently that he couldn’t remember a time “maybe even in the Great Depression, when things went down quite so fast, quite so uniformly around the world.”

Perhaps new economic leadership will emerge during this crisis, under our gifted, charismatic president. It seems likely to consist of people who have the kind of experience, judgment and authority Morgan had — possibly a new “trio” made up of the current Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke; Paul Volcker; and Warren Buffett.

Only Mr. Bernanke is formally in a position to exercise that high authority now, which he is doing — he announced last week that the Fed would inject an extra $1 trillion into the financial system. Mr. Volcker, chairman of the White House Economic Recovery Advisory Board, could easily be promoted to a more dominant role. Mr. Buffett has already stepped up in public, praising the steps the Fed took last fall to insure money markets and commercial paper as “vital in keeping the place going” (if the Fed hadn’t acted, Mr. Buffett told his CNBC interviewer, “we’d be meeting at McDonald’s this morning”).

Moreover, Mr. Buffett said he could “guarantee” that in five years or so “our great economic machine” will be running a lot faster than it is now, with the government playing an enormous role in how quickly it recovers. Last fall he declared that we had just been through an “economic Pearl Harbor.” Last week he said that in order to fight this economic war the country has to unite behind President Obama, the government has to deliver “very, very” clear messages and we all have to focus on three jobs:

Job 1: win the economic war.

Job 2: win the economic war.

Job 3: win the economic war.

Just what Morgan would have said.

Jean Strouse is the author of “Morgan: American Financier” and the director of the Cullman Center for Scholars and Writers at The New York Public Library.

The Fed Didn't Cause the Housing Bubble

By ALAN GREENSPAN

We are in the midst of a global crisis that will unquestionably rank as the most virulent since the 1930s. It will eventually subside and pass into history. But how the interacting and reinforcing causes and effects of this severe contraction are interpreted will shape the reconfiguration of our currently disabled global financial system.

Chad Crowe

There are at least two broad and competing explanations of the origins of this crisis. The first is that the "easy money" policies of the Federal Reserve produced the U.S. housing bubble that is at the core of today's financial mess.

The second, and far more credible, explanation agrees that it was indeed lower interest rates that spawned the speculative euphoria. However, the interest rate that mattered was not the federal-funds rate, but the rate on long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. Between 2002 and 2005, home mortgage rates led U.S. home price change by 11 months. This correlation between home prices and mortgage rates was highly significant, and a far better indicator of rising home prices than the fed-funds rate.

This should not come as a surprise. After all, the prices of long-lived assets have always been determined by discounting the flow of income (or imputed services) by interest rates of the same maturities as the life of the asset. No one, to my knowledge, employs overnight interest rates -- such as the fed-funds rate -- to determine the capitalization rate of real estate, whether it be an office building or a single-family residence.

The Federal Reserve became acutely aware of the disconnect between monetary policy and mortgage rates when the latter failed to respond as expected to the Fed tightening in mid-2004. Moreover, the data show that home mortgage rates had become gradually decoupled from monetary policy even earlier -- in the wake of the emergence, beginning around the turn of this century, of a well arbitraged global market for long-term debt instruments.

U.S. mortgage rates' linkage to short-term U.S. rates had been close for decades. Between 1971 and 2002, the fed-funds rate and the mortgage rate moved in lockstep. The correlation between them was a tight 0.85. Between 2002 and 2005, however, the correlation diminished to insignificance.

As I noted on this page in December 2007, the presumptive cause of the world-wide decline in long-term rates was the tectonic shift in the early 1990s by much of the developing world from heavy emphasis on central planning to increasingly dynamic, export-led market competition. The result was a surge in growth in China and a large number of other emerging market economies that led to an excess of global intended savings relative to intended capital investment. That ex ante excess of savings propelled global long-term interest rates progressively lower between early 2000 and 2005.

That decline in long-term interest rates across a wide spectrum of countries statistically explains, and is the most likely major cause of, real-estate capitalization rates that declined and converged across the globe, resulting in the global housing price bubble. (The U.S. price bubble was at, or below, the median according to the International Monetary Fund.) By 2006, long-term interest rates and the home mortgage rates driven by them, for all developed and the main developing economies, had declined to single digits -- I believe for the first time ever. I would have thought that the weight of such evidence would lead to wide support for this as a global explanation of the current crisis.

However, starting in mid-2007, history began to be rewritten, in large part by my good friend and former colleague, Stanford University Professor John Taylor, with whom I have rarely disagreed. Yet writing in these pages last month, Mr. Taylor unequivocally claimed that had the Federal Reserve from 2003-2005 kept short-term interest rates at the levels implied by his "Taylor Rule," "it would have prevented this housing boom and bust. "This notion has been cited and repeated so often that it has taken on the aura of conventional wisdom.

Aside from the inappropriate use of short-term rates to explain the value of long-term assets, his statistical indictment of Federal Reserve policy in the period 2003-2005 fails to address the aforementioned extraordinary structural developments in the global economy. His statistical analysis carries empirical relationships of earlier decades into the most recent period where they no longer apply.

Moreover, while I believe the "Taylor Rule" is a useful first approximation to the path of monetary policy, its parameters and predictions derive from model structures that have been consistently unable to anticipate the onset of recessions or financial crises. Counterfactuals from such flawed structures cannot form the sole basis for successful policy analysis or advice, with or without the benefit of hindsight.

Given the decoupling of monetary policy from long-term mortgage rates, accelerating the path of monetary tightening that the Fed pursued in 2004-2005 could not have "prevented" the housing bubble. All things considered, I personally prefer Milton Friedman's performance appraisal of the Federal Reserve. In evaluating the period of 1987 to 2005, he wrote on this page in early 2006: "There is no other period of comparable length in which the Federal Reserve System has performed so well. It is more than a difference of degree; it approaches a difference of kind."

How much does it matter whether the bubble was caused by inappropriate monetary policy, over which policy makers have control, or broader global forces over which their control is limited? A great deal.

If it is monetary policy that is at fault, then that can be corrected in the future, at least in principle. If, however, we are dealing with global forces beyond the control of domestic monetary policy makers, as I strongly suspect is the case, then we are facing a broader issue.

Global market competition and integration in goods, services and finance have brought unprecedented gains in material well being. But the growth path of highly competitive markets is cyclical. And on rare occasions it can break down, with consequences such as those we are currently experiencing. It is now very clear that the levels of complexity to which market practitioners at the height of their euphoria tried to push risk-management techniques and products were too much for even the most sophisticated market players to handle properly and prudently.

However, the appropriate policy response is not to bridle financial intermediation with heavy regulation. That would stifle important advances in finance that enhance standards of living. Remember, prior to the crisis, the U.S. economy exhibited an impressive degree of productivity advance. To achieve that with a modest level of combined domestic and borrowed foreign savings (our current account deficit) was a measure of our financial system's precrisis success. The solutions for the financial-market failures revealed by the crisis are higher capital requirements and a wider prosecution of fraud -- not increased micromanagement by government entities.

Any new regulations should improve the ability of financial institutions to effectively direct a nation's savings into the most productive capital investments. Much regulation fails that test, and is often costly and counterproductive. Adequate capital and collateral requirements can address the weaknesses that the crisis has unearthed. Such requirements will not be overly intrusive, and thus will not interfere unduly in private-sector business decisions.

If we are to retain a dynamic world economy capable of producing prosperity and future sustainable growth, we cannot rely on governments to intermediate saving and investment flows. Our challenge in the months ahead will be to install a regulatory regime that will ensure responsible risk management on the part of financial institutions, while encouraging them to continue taking the risks necessary and inherent in any successful market economy.

Mr. Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, is president of Greenspan Associates LLC and author of "The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World" (Penguin, 2007).