Nafta’s Promise, Unfulfilled

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By ELISABETH MALKIN

Published: March 23, 2009

MEXICO CITY — Mexico’s former president, Carlos Salinas, used to promise that free trade and foreign investment would jump-start this country’s development, empowering a richer and more prosperous Mexico “to export goods, not people.”

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Henry Romero/Reuters

A General Motors assembly line in Silao, Mexico. Mexico’s exports have quintupled under Nafta, to $292 billion last year.

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Times Topics: North American Free Trade Agreement

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Henry Romero/Reuters

Nafta, signed by President Carlos Salinas of Mexico, left, and President Bill Clinton, has been in effect for 15 years.

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Alejandro Bringas/Reuters

Workers at a factory in Ciudad Juárez. Economic growth in Mexico under Nafta has not been sufficient to create enough jobs for the million young people who enter the work force each year.

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Fifteen years after the North American Free Trade Agreement took effect, only the first part of that promise has been realized.

Mexico’s exports have exploded underNafta, quintupling to $292 billion last year, but Mexico is still exporting people too, almost half a million each year, seeking opportunities in the United States that they do not have at home.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton will arrive in Mexico on Wednesday and President Obama will visit next month. Both are expected to emphasize the successes of American-Mexican economic cooperation, but it will be hard to ignore how much in Mexico has not changed under Nafta.

Economists here say much of the blame lies with Mexican leaders, unable or unwilling to take on oligarchs and unions controlling key sectors of the economy like energy and telecommunications. But they say some blame goes to the unintended consequences of Nafta.

In some cases, Nafta produced results that were exactly the opposite of what was promised.

For instance, domestic industries were dismantled as multinationals imported parts from their own suppliers.

Local farmers were priced out of the market by food imported tariff-free. Many Mexican farmers simply abandoned their land and headed north.

Although one-quarter of Mexicans live in the countryside, they account for 44 percent of the migrants to the United States. The contradictions of Nafta are apparent in Guadalajara and the rich farmland around it.

On the road from the airport to the city, Mexico’s second-largest, a well-worn sign welcomes visitors to Mexico’s Silicon Valley. After Nafta went into effect, the comparison seemed ambitious but not out of reach.

Global giants spent billions of dollars turning Guadalajara into a manufacturing hub for the information technology industry. The industry boomed, spurred by cheap labor and the sense that Nafta guaranteed investor-friendly policies. Today the city is ringed with low-slung factories that churn out everything from BlackBerrys to digital tape storage libraries for Sun Microsystems.

But investors came because the city was already a center of technology. I.B.M, Hewlett-Packard and others had come in the 1960s and 1970s when Mexico’s market was closed.

After Nafta, the new factories imported parts from their global suppliers, wiping out local companies that had sold printed circuit boards or assembled computers under tariff protection, said Kevin P. Gallagher, a Boston University professor who has written about the Guadalajara information technology industry.

Things grew worse when the tech bubble burst, the American economy cooled and the companies moved to China, where they could pay even lower wages. Once China entered the World Trade Organization, Mexico lost much of the edge in exporting to the United States that Nafta had given it. Employment in Guadalajara’s I.T. factories dropped 37 percent in 2001 and continued to slide for two years.

“The agreement could have brought investment with more value here,” including research, testing and design, said Jesús Palomino, the general manager at Intel’s design center in Guadalajara. “But we did not know how to define or negotiate or take advantage of it.”

Mr. Palomino argues that attracting multinational manufacturers was too limited a focus. He oversees about 300 young engineers who test future Intel products and carry out research and development. The sophisticated Intel design center is an exception to the city’s assembly plants. Those factories mostly hire low-wage labor.

“A new phenomenon has grown up under Nafta — high-productivity poverty,” said Harley Shaiken, chairman of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.

Low wages means low purchasing power. “It is not a successful strategy for globalization,” Mr. Shaiken said.

Even Nafta’s greatest success — exports — has become a liability, as Mexico feels the full brunt of declining consumption in the United States. The auto industry, for example, which has flourished under Nafta, has ground to a virtual standstill. Over all, Mexican auto exports fell more than 50 percent in the first two months of this year compared with 2008, and production dropped almost 45 percent.

The central bank forecasts that as many as 340,000 people could lose their jobs this year, and some investment banks predict the economy could contract as much as 5 percent.

That weakness has driven down the peso, which has lost about a quarter of its value in the last six months. Foreign direct investment fell last year to $18.6 billion from $27.2 billion in 2007.

Still, economists here say much of the responsibility for the lack of development in the last decade and a half lies largely with Mexican leaders and their unwillingness or inability to enact real reforms. “We have an economy that has atrophied because of the lack of reform,” said Gerardo Esquivel, an economist at the Colegio de México.

Other developing countries benefited from globalization, particularly in Asia. But in Mexico, economic growth has averaged about 3 percent a year since Nafta took effect, far below what is needed to create jobs for the million young people who enter the work force each year and the millions more who barely scrape by.

As presidential candidates, both President Obama and Mrs. Clinton promised to renegotiate Nafta. But when Mr. Obama arrives next month, he will find Mexico’s leaders reluctant to revisit the agreement. He will also find them seething over his signing of a spending bill that scrapped a pilot program allowing Mexican long-haul trucks to transport cargo throughout the United States. In retaliation, Mexico has imposed punitive tariffs on $2.4 billion worth of American goods.

Nafta guaranteed Mexico, Canada and the United States access to one another’s highways for cargo transport by 2000.

Perhaps the Mexicans least prepared for globalization were Mexico’s small farmers.

“It isn’t possible for a peasant to make a living from the countryside,” said Francisco Vargas, president of an association that groups together 2,500 farmers from Etzatlán, about 90 minutes west of Guadalajara.

The farmers hold other jobs to subsidize their farming. Mr. Vargas is a teacher. Another of the group’s leaders is a retired accountant; a third has a sideline renting out construction equipment. Some farmers continue thanks to money sent by relatives working in the United States.

Farmers in the region have survived Nafta by raising corn yields through converting to modern farming techniques. They also lobby for government aid and band together to fight private oligopolies that sell seed and buy corn.

But their landholdings remain small, sometimes not more than about 10 acres, and they are at the mercy of rising costs and fluctuating prices. Seed is up about 20 percent because of the peso’s devaluation, while corn is off the high of last year as global demand drops.

The farmers say that they have raised their yields to double Mexico’s average of three metric tons per hectare, or more. (The average for the United States is more than nine tons per hectare.) Late last year, their high yields caught the attention of the federal government in Mexico City, which has promised new financing for the Etzatlán farmers and other commercial corn farmers.

“It’s a race against time,” said Antonio Hernández, an agronomist who advises the farmers for a coalition of farming associations in Jalisco state. “We have to demonstrate this before people abandon the land.”

I.T. industry leaders and the local government in Guadalajara are trying to do the same thing: convince Mexicans that there is opportunity at home.

The group representing the industry in Mexico, known by its Spanish initials as Canieti, now promotes Guadalajara’s ability to produce customized products for customers in the United States, specialized corporate software and portions of software for operating systems. Canieti officials also promote the advantage for “pizza products,” like new cellphones that must be delivered on time.

The government and Canieti have put up $4 million to buy equipment and train 150 young people in computer animation, in a bid to attract joint ventures for co-productions and video games.

But Mr. Palomino, the general manager at the Intel design center, argues that the industry should also promote small local companies and encourage them to establish joint ventures in the United States. Those changes would nourish a culture of entrepreneurship that he believes has yet to emerge.

Professor Gallagher at Boston University argues that free trade on its own does not bring development. “Nafta was a great opportunity, but you had to build on it,” he said.

La táctica y estrategia

Paul Krugman reprueba el paquete para limpiar de activos tóxicos las hojas de balance de los bancos estadounidenses. No obstante, la medida ha causado una buena impresión en los mercados de capital lo que implica confianza que es el activo más importante en una crisis como lo explica este excelente artículo. 

When the economy really did fall of a cliff. 

March 23, 2009

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

When the Economy Really Did ‘Fall Off a Cliff’

By JEAN STROUSE

IN what may come to be the definitive line about our current economic crisis, Warren Buffett said on the CNBC program “Squawk Box” this month that the United States economy has “fallen off a cliff.”

The most trusted investor in history went on the air to talk, with characteristic candor and humor, about the horrendous truth we pretty much know, possibly in an effort to calm things down and point toward some answers we don’t yet know. He proceeded to give his views on what went wrong (“everybody thought house prices could go nothing but up ... so you had $11 trillion of residential mortgage debt built on this theory ”), on people’s paralyzing fear and confusion (“We are in a very, very vicious negative feedback cycle .... I don’t want this to be the last line of the movie”), and on the absolute necessity of fixing the banks and taking clear, decisive action.

A look back at the handling of another financial crisis a full century ago underlines the point about decisive action. You just don’t want to take the wrong decisive action. Markets today are immeasurably more complex, global, fast-moving and regulated (a lot of good that did) than they were a hundred years ago, but the need for strong leadership has not changed.

In early 1906, the banker Jacob Schiff told a group of colleagues that if the United States did not modernize its banking and currency systems, its economy would, in effect, fall off a cliff — that the country would “have such a panic ... as will make all previous panics look like child’s play.”

Yet the country failed to reform its financial institutions, and conditions deteriorated steadily over the next 20 months. There was a worldwide credit shortage. The American stock market crashed twice. The young Dow Jones industrial average lost half of its value.

In October 1907, when a panic started among trust companies in New York and terrified depositors lined up to get their money out, Schiff’s dire prediction seemed about to come true. The United States had no Federal Reserve, the Treasury secretary did not have much political authority, and the president, Theodore Roosevelt, was off shooting game in Louisiana.

J. Pierpont Morgan, a 70-year-old private banker, quietly took charge of the situation.

In the absence of a central bank, Morgan had for decades been acting as the country’s unofficial lender of last resort, gathering reserves and supplying capital to the markets in periods of crisis. For two harrowing weeks in 1907, with the whole world watching, he operated like a general, deploying three young lieutenants to do leg work and supply him with information, and bringing two other leading bankers, James Stillman of National City Bank and George Baker of the First National Bank, into a senior “trio” to make executive decisions. (First National and National City eventually combined to form what is now Citigroup — are the shades of Baker and Stillman writhing over what has become of their descendant institution?)

The Morgan teams ran “stress tests” on the unregulated trust companies, figuring out which were impossibly overleveraged and should be allowed to fail, and which were basically sound but crippled by the panic. Once they had determined that a trust was essentially healthy, the bankers supplied it with cash, matching their loans dollar-for-dollar with the trust’s collateral assets.

When the New York Stock Exchange nearly closed early one day in October 1907 because financial institutions calling in loans were choking off the market’s money supply, Morgan summoned the presidents of New York’s major commercial banks to his office and came up with $24 million to lend to the exchange. Next, New York City ran out of cash to meet its payroll and interest obligations; Morgan and company conjured up a $30 million loan and prevented default.

At the end of Week 1, President Roosevelt sent a letter to the press congratulating the “substantial businessmen who in this crisis have acted with such wisdom and public spirit.” Shipments of gold were on the way from London to New York, and confidence had returned to the French Bourse, “owing,” reported one paper, “to the belief that the strong men in American finance would succeed in their efforts to check the spirit of the panic.” During a panic, confidence is almost as good as gold.

At the end of Week 2, Morgan called 50 presidents of trust companies to his private library on East 36th Street, locked the doors, and did not let them out until they had signed on to a final $25 million loan. The scholar of Renaissance art Bernard Berenson told his patron Isabella Stewart Gardner that “Morgan should be represented as buttressing up the tottering fabric of finance the way Giotto painted St. Francis holding up the falling church with his shoulder.”

Though Morgan had a large sense of public duty, he had not shouldered the falling church out of pure altruism. His self-interest operated on a national scale. His clients — many of them Europeans who had invested for decades in the emerging American economy through the House of Morgan — had billions of dollars committed in the United States. In watching over their long-term interests, trying to control the excesses of the business cycle and maintain the value of the dollar, Morgan had come to serve as guardian of American credit in international markets.

His power in 1907 derived not from the size of his own fortune but from the trust placed in him by investors, other bankers and international statesman. After Morgan died in 1913, the newspapers reported his net worth as about $80 million — roughly $1.7 billion in today’s dollars. John D. Rockefeller, already worth a billion in 1913 dollars, is said to have read the figure, shaken his head, and remarked, “And to think he wasn’t even a rich man.”

Trust in Morgan was by no means universal. In 1907, some of his critics charged that he had started the panic in order to scoop up assets at fire-sale prices and line his own pockets. In fact, the Morgan banks lost $21 million that year.

The difficulty today of assigning dollar values to “toxic” assets makes Morgan’s job look easy. Yet though the amount of money required for the 1907 bailouts is pocket change compared to the current trillions, at the time, the troubles and the numbers seemed enormous.

No single figure, much less a private banker, could wield the kind of power in today’s gargantuan collapsing markets that Morgan had a hundred years ago. And so far, not even the combined official powers of the Fed and Treasury have been able to stop the cascading disasters. Paul Volcker, the former Federal Reserve chairman, said recently that he couldn’t remember a time “maybe even in the Great Depression, when things went down quite so fast, quite so uniformly around the world.”

Perhaps new economic leadership will emerge during this crisis, under our gifted, charismatic president. It seems likely to consist of people who have the kind of experience, judgment and authority Morgan had — possibly a new “trio” made up of the current Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke; Paul Volcker; and Warren Buffett.

Only Mr. Bernanke is formally in a position to exercise that high authority now, which he is doing — he announced last week that the Fed would inject an extra $1 trillion into the financial system. Mr. Volcker, chairman of the White House Economic Recovery Advisory Board, could easily be promoted to a more dominant role. Mr. Buffett has already stepped up in public, praising the steps the Fed took last fall to insure money markets and commercial paper as “vital in keeping the place going” (if the Fed hadn’t acted, Mr. Buffett told his CNBC interviewer, “we’d be meeting at McDonald’s this morning”).

Moreover, Mr. Buffett said he could “guarantee” that in five years or so “our great economic machine” will be running a lot faster than it is now, with the government playing an enormous role in how quickly it recovers. Last fall he declared that we had just been through an “economic Pearl Harbor.” Last week he said that in order to fight this economic war the country has to unite behind President Obama, the government has to deliver “very, very” clear messages and we all have to focus on three jobs:

Job 1: win the economic war.

Job 2: win the economic war.

Job 3: win the economic war.

Just what Morgan would have said.

Jean Strouse is the author of “Morgan: American Financier” and the director of the Cullman Center for Scholars and Writers at The New York Public Library.

The Fed Didn't Cause the Housing Bubble

By ALAN GREENSPAN

We are in the midst of a global crisis that will unquestionably rank as the most virulent since the 1930s. It will eventually subside and pass into history. But how the interacting and reinforcing causes and effects of this severe contraction are interpreted will shape the reconfiguration of our currently disabled global financial system.

Chad Crowe

There are at least two broad and competing explanations of the origins of this crisis. The first is that the "easy money" policies of the Federal Reserve produced the U.S. housing bubble that is at the core of today's financial mess.

The second, and far more credible, explanation agrees that it was indeed lower interest rates that spawned the speculative euphoria. However, the interest rate that mattered was not the federal-funds rate, but the rate on long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. Between 2002 and 2005, home mortgage rates led U.S. home price change by 11 months. This correlation between home prices and mortgage rates was highly significant, and a far better indicator of rising home prices than the fed-funds rate.

This should not come as a surprise. After all, the prices of long-lived assets have always been determined by discounting the flow of income (or imputed services) by interest rates of the same maturities as the life of the asset. No one, to my knowledge, employs overnight interest rates -- such as the fed-funds rate -- to determine the capitalization rate of real estate, whether it be an office building or a single-family residence.

The Federal Reserve became acutely aware of the disconnect between monetary policy and mortgage rates when the latter failed to respond as expected to the Fed tightening in mid-2004. Moreover, the data show that home mortgage rates had become gradually decoupled from monetary policy even earlier -- in the wake of the emergence, beginning around the turn of this century, of a well arbitraged global market for long-term debt instruments.

U.S. mortgage rates' linkage to short-term U.S. rates had been close for decades. Between 1971 and 2002, the fed-funds rate and the mortgage rate moved in lockstep. The correlation between them was a tight 0.85. Between 2002 and 2005, however, the correlation diminished to insignificance.

As I noted on this page in December 2007, the presumptive cause of the world-wide decline in long-term rates was the tectonic shift in the early 1990s by much of the developing world from heavy emphasis on central planning to increasingly dynamic, export-led market competition. The result was a surge in growth in China and a large number of other emerging market economies that led to an excess of global intended savings relative to intended capital investment. That ex ante excess of savings propelled global long-term interest rates progressively lower between early 2000 and 2005.

That decline in long-term interest rates across a wide spectrum of countries statistically explains, and is the most likely major cause of, real-estate capitalization rates that declined and converged across the globe, resulting in the global housing price bubble. (The U.S. price bubble was at, or below, the median according to the International Monetary Fund.) By 2006, long-term interest rates and the home mortgage rates driven by them, for all developed and the main developing economies, had declined to single digits -- I believe for the first time ever. I would have thought that the weight of such evidence would lead to wide support for this as a global explanation of the current crisis.

However, starting in mid-2007, history began to be rewritten, in large part by my good friend and former colleague, Stanford University Professor John Taylor, with whom I have rarely disagreed. Yet writing in these pages last month, Mr. Taylor unequivocally claimed that had the Federal Reserve from 2003-2005 kept short-term interest rates at the levels implied by his "Taylor Rule," "it would have prevented this housing boom and bust. "This notion has been cited and repeated so often that it has taken on the aura of conventional wisdom.

Aside from the inappropriate use of short-term rates to explain the value of long-term assets, his statistical indictment of Federal Reserve policy in the period 2003-2005 fails to address the aforementioned extraordinary structural developments in the global economy. His statistical analysis carries empirical relationships of earlier decades into the most recent period where they no longer apply.

Moreover, while I believe the "Taylor Rule" is a useful first approximation to the path of monetary policy, its parameters and predictions derive from model structures that have been consistently unable to anticipate the onset of recessions or financial crises. Counterfactuals from such flawed structures cannot form the sole basis for successful policy analysis or advice, with or without the benefit of hindsight.

Given the decoupling of monetary policy from long-term mortgage rates, accelerating the path of monetary tightening that the Fed pursued in 2004-2005 could not have "prevented" the housing bubble. All things considered, I personally prefer Milton Friedman's performance appraisal of the Federal Reserve. In evaluating the period of 1987 to 2005, he wrote on this page in early 2006: "There is no other period of comparable length in which the Federal Reserve System has performed so well. It is more than a difference of degree; it approaches a difference of kind."

How much does it matter whether the bubble was caused by inappropriate monetary policy, over which policy makers have control, or broader global forces over which their control is limited? A great deal.

If it is monetary policy that is at fault, then that can be corrected in the future, at least in principle. If, however, we are dealing with global forces beyond the control of domestic monetary policy makers, as I strongly suspect is the case, then we are facing a broader issue.

Global market competition and integration in goods, services and finance have brought unprecedented gains in material well being. But the growth path of highly competitive markets is cyclical. And on rare occasions it can break down, with consequences such as those we are currently experiencing. It is now very clear that the levels of complexity to which market practitioners at the height of their euphoria tried to push risk-management techniques and products were too much for even the most sophisticated market players to handle properly and prudently.

However, the appropriate policy response is not to bridle financial intermediation with heavy regulation. That would stifle important advances in finance that enhance standards of living. Remember, prior to the crisis, the U.S. economy exhibited an impressive degree of productivity advance. To achieve that with a modest level of combined domestic and borrowed foreign savings (our current account deficit) was a measure of our financial system's precrisis success. The solutions for the financial-market failures revealed by the crisis are higher capital requirements and a wider prosecution of fraud -- not increased micromanagement by government entities.

Any new regulations should improve the ability of financial institutions to effectively direct a nation's savings into the most productive capital investments. Much regulation fails that test, and is often costly and counterproductive. Adequate capital and collateral requirements can address the weaknesses that the crisis has unearthed. Such requirements will not be overly intrusive, and thus will not interfere unduly in private-sector business decisions.

If we are to retain a dynamic world economy capable of producing prosperity and future sustainable growth, we cannot rely on governments to intermediate saving and investment flows. Our challenge in the months ahead will be to install a regulatory regime that will ensure responsible risk management on the part of financial institutions, while encouraging them to continue taking the risks necessary and inherent in any successful market economy.

Mr. Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, is president of Greenspan Associates LLC and author of "The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World" (Penguin, 2007).

 

Discurso Slim

 

El ciudadano Carlos Slim Helú: Gracias, buenas tardes. Me da muchísimo gusto y me honra estar con ustedes en este foro tan importante, no había un antecedente, creo, desde 1931, cuando la Gran Depresión en la que hubo esa unidad entre el bloque revolucionario del Congreso con las Cámaras de Comercio e Industria.

 

Esa fue una reunión, una alianza importante que se formó y que permitió, con las políticas públicas que en ese momento se adoptaron, crecer 6.2 por ciento de 1932 a 1982. Ese crecimiento sostenido durante tantos años ha sido espectacular, era el famoso milagro mexicano, fue una transformación enorme que el país logró gracias a esos esfuerzos y a esas políticas públicas, en las que se hicieron políticas de Estado que permanecieron por tantos años.

 

Apena que desde 82, después de la gran crisis de la deuda externa, hayamos crecido cero en términos de per cápita, no es mediocre, es cero, es peor que mediocre, sobre todo si tomamos en cuenta la población que se ha expulsado, es cero por ciento, incluyendo a los mexicanos que han tenido que irse por no encontrar posibilidades de trabajo en este país.

 

Ese 82, esa gran crisis de deuda externa tuvo varias razones, una fue quizás los Cetes públicos importantes, otro sin duda fue la disponibilidad de petro-dólares, de disponibilidad de financiamiento, de crédito que permitió endeudarse en forma excesiva, pero la puntilla y la causa fue externa, fue la tasa de interés al 21 por ciento. Comprenderán que una economía o en una empresa o en una persona normal a la que le sube cuatro veces el costo financiero, tiene que entrar en problema.

 

De ahí, de esa deuda externa con varios fines, entre ellos cobrar, vino el plan y el modelo del Consenso de Washington, modelo que tiene varias virtudes, pero cuyos defectos hemos sufrido durante tantos años y que por supuesto los países en desarrollo no lo contemplan, no les hacen caso.

 

Hemos visto en estos abusos, que ha habido Fondo Monetario, los tecnócratas, los académicos, los dogmáticos, ideólogos brillaron por su ausencia, en ningún momento dado llamaron la atención. Lo más cercano fue la exuberancia irracional de los mercados de diciembre de 96, de Greenspan, cuando el índice era 6 mil 500, luego se fue a 13 mil.

 

Esa es una situación realmente clara, hay que tener una visión de largo plazo hacia delante, pero hay que saber lo que ha pasado en el pasado. No hay soluciones simplistas al desarrollo sostenido, el país pasó de ser una ciudad agrícola y rural a una sociedad urbana e industrial, ahora hay que pasar a ser una sociedad terciaria, de servicios, tecnológica, de conocimiento, tener contemplado qué es lo que esta sociedad y sus nuevos paradigmas reclaman, para irnos en esa dirección.

 

Me dio mucho gusto, en la inauguración del foro, no sólo el foro mismo, sino las palabras del presidente del Congreso, el diputado César Duarte, que dice: “Hay que hacer una revisión estructural del modelo y rediseño del sistema financiero”. Es lo que hace falta.

 

También el presidente del Senado habló de propuestas y compromisos, también habló de cambios estructurales para mejorar productividad y competencia, lo cual es indiscutible que son dos argumentos fundamentales en toda esta situación que estamos viviendo.

 

Esta crisis que se inicia en los noventa, que trata de frenar Greenspan, con su exuberancia irracional; en el 2000, 2001 hay un susto por la destrucción de riqueza de esa época. Después vienen una serie de políticas excesivas, agresivas, laxas, monetaria y fiscal que hicieron que esa crisis —que se estaba corrigiendo en 2001, que empezó a corregirse en el 2000, 2001, 2002— se saliera de toda proporción y nos llevara a lo que estamos viviendo hoy.

 

Hoy, el epicentro es la gran crisis de las instituciones financieras, por los excesos, los grandes excesos que tuvieron en sus políticas liberales, neoliberales con falta de todo sentido de cuidado, tanto —yo diría— principalmente el gobierno de Estados Unidos. Y, obviamente, las consecuencias vienen en las decisiones de la falta de regulación y supervisión de las instituciones financieras internacionales, creando nuevos instrumentos y derivados, en que su factor principal es lo que llaman “apalancamiento”, la posibilidad de hacer con 1 peso, 20 o 30 o 50.

 

Por ejemplo, para comprar commodity había que dar 5 por ciento de garantía. Para comprar derivados no se daba garantía. Entonces se multiplicaba por cientos los riesgos y, bueno, pues esto es lo que estamos sufriendo.

 

Fue una especulación con el petróleo, la especulación con los alimentos, que afortunadamente se vino abajo, los commodity en general, porque no había que dar nada y se creó una serie de jugadores, apostadores, neófitos, muchachos que llegaban creyendo que todo iba a ser para arriba y para siempre, y apostaban y apostaban. Y bueno, esto es lo que estamos pagando.

 

Pero lo grave es que, aunque el epicentro es Estados Unidos, las grandes consecuencias o más consecuencias se están teniendo fuera. Por ejemplo, Japón; mientras Estados Unidos cayó 3.8 el producto interno bruto en Japón cayó 8. En Alemania 8, creo que en Japón por ahí o 9, el último trimestre.

 

Estamos en el momento, yo diría, ya pasó el 29, estamos viviendo el 30; hay que evitar el 31, 32 y 33. Hay que evitar que ese mercado financiero que no se ha logrado estabilizar y no se ve que se esté estabilizando, y que, por supuesto a través del crédito contamina la economía real, no colapse el mundo económico como lo hizo en aquella ocasión y como se ve que lo está haciendo, en muchos sentidos, en este momento.

 

Está desmedido el crecimiento del desempleo, se habla de dos dígitos, España ya está también en dos dígitos y altos. Japón, Alemania, todo el mundo decreciendo mucho. Nuestros países tienen la fuerza, nuestros países —hablo de Latinoamérica— tienen la fuerza de la mejor en los términos de intercambio en estos últimos años; nosotros el petróleo, otros países el sorgo, otros el trigo, etcétera, y tenemos los minerales.

 

Tenemos una fortaleza económica, éstos, nuestros países, que tenemos que cuidar y aplicar con mucho cuidado para evitar estos colapsos físicos.

 

No cabe duda que el producto interno bruto mexicano se va a desplomar, se va a caer, va a ser negativo, ya desde el último trimestre del año pasado, no sabemos cuánto dure, pero va a ser muy fuerte el efecto.

 

Ahí es donde yo digo: el producto interno bruto va a ser negativo, va a ser sustancialmente negativo por la caída del petróleo y de la exportación, entre otras cosas, y las consecuencias también internas.

 

Pero hay que cuidar el empleo. No hay que preocuparnos si es menos 2 o menos 1 o 0. Hay que cuidarnos cuál es la masa salarial, cuál es el empleo, y hay que establecer como el acuerdo nacional que encabezó el presidente de la república, buscar medidas que protejan el empleo y el ingreso familiar. Eso es lo fundamental que hay que hacer en este momento.

 

A mí me da gusto que en ese acuerdo se retomó lo que todos estos modelos y esas ideologías y esos dogmatismos y doctrinas que estuvimos viviendo tantos años, desde 83, pero sobre todo cuando el consenso de Washington empieza a aplicarse con más firmeza en nuestros países, nos ha mantenido con crecimientos cero.

 

Yo creo que la gran bondad que estamos teniendo, al igual que ocurrió en esa reunión con el bloque revolucionario del Congreso es que nos estamos volcando a la economía interna, ya nos estamos dando cuenta que no todo es pensar afuera.

 

Pensamos que la inversión extranjera es maravillosa, parece que fuera donativo. La inversión extranjera no es un donativo. La inversión extranjera viene porque estamos ofreciendo buenas utilidades. Las empresas modernas son los viejos ejércitos. Los ejércitos conquistaban territorios y cobraban tributos. Las empresas conquistan mercados y cobran dividendos, regalías, royalty, transferencias de equis y de ye y de zeta.

 

Hay que volcarse a la economía interna. Obviamente necesitamos inversión extranjera y adoptar tecnología y tal. Pero tenemos que volcarnos en la economía interna, cuidar mucho nuestra economía interna, impulsar las Pymes, la pequeña y mediana, bajar la mortalidad empresarial, impulsar que en México —y no lo digo por nosotros— existan empresas fuertes que compitan internacionalmente.

No hay países fuertes sin empresas fuertes. Si los países no tienen empresas fuertes están volviéndose neocolonias, de alguna forma, necesitan tener la fuerza; no internamente, sino hacia fuera, de poderse proyectar.

 

Por eso vemos países que han impulsado mucho las empresas fuertes, su transnacionalización, inclusive con impulsos fiscales como es España que les da deducible el 75 al 90 por ciento de la inversión. Brasil que apoya con el Banco de Desarrollo, etcétera.

 

Y como lo ha hecho Estados Unidos desde la doctrina Monroe, desde Poinsett a la Colonia, ayudando a la independencia para controlar las economías y los mercados nuestros, hasta la fecha.

 

Creo que es muy importante atender la economía interna. Qué bueno que nos volcamos de nuevo a la banca de desarrollo; la teníamos olvidada. La banca de desarrollo es fundamental para el crecimiento de nuestro país. Tenemos que volver también a hacer infraestructura, a mejorar nuestra capital humano; tenemos un gran presupuesto en él, ahí va la calidad; es baja calidad. Necesitamos modernizarlo, mejorar la calidad y pasar ya a la cultura digital, ya no a alfabetizar, sino alfabetizar digitalmente a la población.

 

Necesitamos ser competitivos en esta civilización del conocimiento, de la información, etcétera, y necesitamos competencia, estoy de acuerdo con la competencia. Es muy importante, es como si fuéramos un atleta que no compite con nadie, no va a progresar nunca. Necesitamos usar en la competencia referencias internacionales. Qué tiempo hizo éste, cómo salta el otro, cómo juega el beisbolista o el futbolista; qué técnico es el mejor.

 

Sin duda tenemos que estar abiertos a la competencia y a la globalización. No es una alternativa; es una necesidad. Es un paradigma esta nueva civilización, aunque en este momento se está retrayendo porque el colapso económico, la falta de empleo, la falta de consumo, la caída de la economía americana y de las economías desarrolladas, obviamente, a los países que exportan les van a bajar sus importaciones. Van a bajar los precios de los primarios, como ya bajaron, etcétera; entonces va a haber una caída importante del comercio internacional.

Pero, aparte del concepto el comercio internacional se va a caer el empleo, va a haber mucho desempleo, va a subir el desempleo como no teníamos noticia en nuestra vida personal —sólo historia de los 30—; van a quebrar las empresas, muchas chicas, medianas y grandes; van a cerrar los comercios, va a haber locales cerrados por todos lados, van a haber inmuebles vacíos. Es una situación que va a ser delicada. No quiero ser catastrofista, pero hay que prepararse para prever y no estar viendo las consecuencias después y estar llorando.

 

Yo creo que como hicimos el 31, hay que retomar nuestras decisiones, hay que ver qué modelo necesitamos tener, cómo debe operar, cómo vamos a salir de esta crisis. Tenemos que salir más fuertes de esta crisis. ¿Cómo? Creando capital humano y físico. Si tenemos un buen capital físico, el capital humano va a ser muy importante.

 

Se impulsa mucho el empleo a través de las Pymes, todos sabemos eso. Pero también hay que atender nuestro sector agropecuario que puede estar un poco descuidado y, por supuesto, la infraestructura. Y lo más rápido, más efectivo y que genera mayor empleo que la infraestructura y que la construcción misma de la infraestructura —que es fundamental— es el mantenimiento de la infraestructura. Para eso no hay que esperar el plan, el proyecto, la ingeniería, ni el derecho de vía, ni tal ni tal. Ése se hace de un día a otro.

 

Las escuelas, hay 30 mil escuelas en mal estado. Hay que arreglarlas, hay que modernizarlas, hay que llevar ventanas, baños, techos, pinturas, que están realmente en deplorables condiciones;, igual hacerlo en los hospitales, en los centros de salud, en las oficinas de gobierno, en las zonas arqueológicas, cuidando la biodiversidad, el ambiente, etcétera.

 

Creo que hay una capacidad brutal en México de dar empleo intensivo, con muy poco dinero, y por supuesto, hay que buscar la combinación del capital público y privado para impulsar aquellos proyectos que lo justifiquen de esa forma. Creo que tenemos que buscar salir, como decía, más fuertes de esto.

 

A mí me llama la atención que todavía sigan los dogmas, después de 26 años de fracaso, todavía encuentran nuevas fórmulas y nuevos culpables para justificar que no es, aunque los que han sido más importantes lo han reconocido, como Williamson; yo creo que además, en esta situación de estos últimos años, hemos hecho chica a la clase media, la hemos afectado mucho.

 

Buena parte de lo que señalaba el presidente de la Comisión de Competencia, de que es el 30 o 40 por ciento de los ingresos, porque no tienen ingreso, la gente no tiene ingreso. La tercera parte de los estudiantes de la UNAM viven con un ingreso familiar de cuatro salarios mínimos, que hoy son 400 dólares..., eso no es ingreso. Necesitamos mejorar el empleo y el ingreso de la gente.

 

Se discute muchas veces entre riqueza e ingreso. No que la riqueza sea privada, colectiva, pública; tiene que manejarse con eficacia para crear más riqueza, y su fruto, que es el ingreso; tiene que tener una mejor distribución del ingreso.

 

Y vemos cómo se puede, sin duda, una de las formas de mejorar la distribución del ingreso es con educación, es con empleo, y buen empleo. La educación no solamente tiene la ventaja de formar capital humano, sino que es mejor oferta. El que tiene buena educación tiene mayores alternativas de trabajo.

 

Todavía me faltan varias cosas, pero básicamente insistir en el empleo en México. Creo que ya se me está yendo el tiempo. Yo creo que hay que buscar, sin duda, los capitales nacionales fuertes y competitivos, que al tú a tú con las trasnacionales, crear más riqueza pública y que no se usen.

 

Cuando falla una iniciativa fiscal en el Congreso, que no se usen los monopolios del Estado para sustituir la recaudación fiscal. Que no se suba la energía como se ha estado haciendo para recaudar fiscalmente. Que no se use la gasolina para recaudación fiscal. Ese acuerdo debe estar aparte. Deben ser empresas que se manejen con autonomía y fuera del presupuesto, para evitar que cuando se autoriza un ingreso no se sube un punto en la red o tal o tal y se le suben los precios y se tiene esa recaudación.

 

Por último, les quiero decir aquí, como hay varias cosas que han tenido que ver. Lo que dicen los Estados Unidos dicen: vaya a América. Compra en América. El ministro Sebastián, de la industria española dice: “ya hay algo que nuestros senadores pueden hacer por su país, que es apostar por España, por nuestros productos, nuestra industria y nuestros servicios”. Apostar por nosotros mismos. Está empezando a haber un nacionalismo económico para el consumo de Estados Unidos. Ojalá y para nosotros no sea “sell-México”, “vendamos México”.

 

Le estoy dejando, por favor, al Legislativo, información sobre lo que es la competencia a la que se refería el presidente de la Comisión. Aquí señala que las razones principales más problemáticas, factores de México, es ineficiencia de la burocracia gubernamental, primero, 18 por ciento; corrupción; inadecuada infraestructura, regulaciones restrictivas, regulaciones de impuestos, acceso al financiamiento, tax raise, crime, crimen y robo, inadecuada educación de la fuerza de tarea.

 

Les dejo esto que es del foro. Nos tiene en lugar 60. No es tampoco la ley de Dios, pues porque en primer lugar está Estados Unidos, ya sabemos que no es el más competitivo del mundo, pues nos están llenando de productos por todos lados.

 

Les dejo, por favor, la información esta,  y les agradezco mucho su atención, el tiempo y la invitación.

Why 'Stimulus' Will Mean Inflation

In a global downturn the Fed will have to print money to meet our obligations.

By GEORGE MELLOAN

As Congress blithely ushers its trillion dollar "stimulus" package toward law and the U.S. Treasury prepares to begin writing checks on this vast new appropriation, it might be wise to ask a simple question: Who's going to finance it?

That might seem like a no-brainer, which perhaps explains why no one has bothered to ask. Treasury securities are selling at high prices and finding buyers even though yields are low, hovering below 3% for 10-year notes. Congress is able to assure itself that it will finance the stimulus with cheap credit. But how long will credit be cheap? Will it still be when the Treasury is scrounging around in the international credit markets six months or a year from now? That seems highly unlikely.

Let's have a look at the credit market. Treasurys have been strong because the stock market collapse and the mortgage-backed securities fiasco sent the whole world running for safety. The best looking port in the storm, as usual, was U.S. Treasury paper. That is what gave the dollar and Treasury securities the lift they now enjoy.

But that surge was a one-time event and doesn't necessarily mean that a big new batch of Treasury securities will find an equally strong market. Most likely it won't as the global economy spirals downward.

For one thing, a very important cycle has been interrupted by the crash. For years, the U.S. has run large trade deficits with China and Japan and those two countries have invested their surpluses mostly in U.S. Treasury securities. Their holdings are enormous: As of Nov. 30 last year, China held $682 billion in Treasurys, a sharp rise from $459 billion a year earlier. Japan had reduced its holdings, to $577 billion from $590 billion a year earlier, but remains a huge creditor. The two account for almost 65% of total Treasury securities held by foreign owners, 19% of the total U.S. national debt, and over 30% of Treasurys held by the public.

In the lush years of the U.S. credit boom, it was rationalized that this circular arrangement was good for all concerned. Exports fueled China's rapid economic growth and created jobs for its huge work force, American workers could raise their living standards by buying cheap Chinese goods. China's dollar surplus gave the U.S. Treasury a captive pool of investment to finance congressional deficits. It was argued, persuasively, that China and Japan had no choice but to buy U.S. bonds if they wanted to keep their exports to the U.S. flowing. They also would hurt their own interests if they tried to unload Treasurys because that would send the value of their remaining holdings down.

But what if they stopped buying bonds not out of choice but because they were out of money? The virtuous circle so much praised would be broken. Something like that seems to be happening now. As the recession deepens, U.S. consumers are spending less, even on cheap Chinese goods and certainly on Japanese cars and electronic products. Japan, already a smaller market for U.S. debt last November, is now suffering what some have described as "free fall" in industrial production. Its two champions, Toyota and Sony, are faltering badly. China's growth also is slowing, and it is plagued by rising unemployment.

American officials seem not to have noticed this abrupt and dangerous change in global patterns of trade and finance. The new Treasury secretary, Timothy Geithner, at his Senate confirmation hearing harped on that old Treasury mantra about China "manipulating" its currency to gain trade advantage. Vice President Joe Biden followed up with a further lecture to the Chinese but said the U.S. will not move "unilaterally" to keep out Chinese exports. One would hope not "unilaterally" or any other way if the U.S. hopes to keep flogging its Treasurys to the Chinese.

The Congressional Budget Office is predicting the federal deficit will reach $1.2 trillion this fiscal year. That's more than double the $455 billion deficit posted for fiscal 2008, and some private estimates put the likely outcome even higher. That will drive up interest costs in the federal budget even if Treasury yields stay low. But if a drop in world market demand for Treasurys sends borrowing costs upward, there could be a ballooning of the interest cost line in the budget that will worsen an already frightening outlook. Credit for the rest of the economy will become more dear as well, worsening the recession. Treasury's Wednesday announcement that it will sell a record $67 billion in notes and bonds next week and $493 billion in this quarter weakened Treasury prices, revealing market sensitivity to heavy financing.

So what is the outlook? The stimulus package is rolling through Congress like an express train packed with goodies, so an enormous deficit seems to be a given. Entitlements will go up instead of being brought under better control, auguring big future deficits. Where will the Treasury find all those trillions in a depressed world economy?

There is only one answer. The Obama administration and Congress will call on Ben Bernanke at the Fed to demand that he create more dollars -- lots and lots of them. The Fed already is talking of buying longer-term Treasurys to support the market, so it will be more of the same -- much more.

And what will be the result? Well, the product of this sort of thing is called inflation. The Fed's outpouring of dollar liquidity after the September crash replaced the liquidity lost by the financial sector and has so far caused no significant uptick in consumer prices. But the worry lies in what will happen next.

Even when the economy and the securities markets are sluggish, the Fed's financing of big federal deficits can be inflationary. We learned that in the late 1970s, when the Fed's deficit financing sent the CPI up to an annual rate of almost 15%. That confounded the Keynesian theorists who believed then, as now, that federal spending "stimulus" would restore economic health.

Inflation is the product of the demand for money as well as of the supply. And if the Fed finances federal deficits in a moribund economy, it can create more money than the economy can use. The result is "stagflation," a term coined to describe the 1970s experience. As the global economy slows and Congress relies more on the Fed to finance a huge deficit, there is a very real danger of a return of stagflation. I wonder why no one in Congress or the Obama administration has thought of that as a potential consequence of their stimulus package.

Mr. Melloan is a former deputy editor of the Journal's editorial page.